Hardening the Hardware: A Reverse-engineering Resilient Secure Chip

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Abhrajit Sengupta, Muhammad Yasin, Mohammed Nabeel, Mohammed Ashraf, Jeyavijayan Rajendran and Ozgur Sinanoglu
With the globalization of integrated circuit (IC) supply chain, the semi-conductor industry is facing a number of security threats, such as Intellectual Property (IP) piracy, hardware Trojans, and counterfeiting. To defend against such threats at the hardware level, logic locking was proposed as a promising countermeasure. Yet, several recent attacks have completely undermined its security by successfully retrieving the secret key. Here, we present stripped-functionality logic locking (SFLL), which resists all existing attacks by hiding a part of the functionality in the form of a secret key.